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Abstract
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage
model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved).
Roth and Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, asked
for an explanation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this
question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two important features: the
existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes. c© 2000
Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Resume
Dans la theorie des ‘agences matrimoniales a deux niveaux’ il existe deux modeles bien
connus: le modele des ‘mariages’ (sans transactions nancieres) et celui des ‘allocations’ (avec
paiement). Roth et Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1990, ont souleve le probleme de trouver une bonne explication qui rende compte des similarites
dans le comportement de ces deux modeles. Nous nous occupons de cette question en introduisant
une generalisation commune qui conserve les deux aspects importants: l’existence d’un resultat
stable et la structure de treillis de l’ensemble des resultats stables. c© 2000 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The interest in the theory of matching comes from an unusual blend of disci-
plines. If economic markets are modeled in the language of matching games, then
game-theoretical questions arise that often have combinatorial solutions. Hence, this
subject is treated both in the economic, game-theoretic and combinatorial literature.
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By a two-sided matching market we mean a situation where there are two distinct sets
of agents, P and Q, that are to be matched in pairs consisting of one P-agent and one
Q-agent. Roth and Sotomayor [7] have written a comprehensive survey of the theory
of two-sided matching markets, mainly dealing with two kinds of two-sided matching
markets, called the marriage model and the assignment model. In the marriage model,
the agents have absolute preferences on their candidates for marriage, as opposed to
the assignment model where there is money involved, and the goal of the agents is to
get as big a prot as possible from their match. The possibility of monetary transfers
in this latter model makes it ‘exible’ as compared to the more ‘rigid’ marriage model.
Viewing the matching procedure as a game played by the agents, an outcome of
the game will be a matching of certain P-agents with certain Q-agents, together with
a payo to each agent in case there is money in the model. Roth and Sotomayor
cites empirical evidence for the importance of stability of an outcome, i.e. absence of
‘blocking pairs’ | pairs of agents that are not matched but who both have incentive
to break up with their current match in order to match up with each other instead.
For both models mentioned above, a stable outcome is known to exist. Gale and
Shapley [3] presented an algorithm for nding a stable outcome in the marriage model.
Demange et al. [2] solved the same problem for the assignment model. It is also well
known that the set of stable outcomes in both cases, under certain conditions, is a
complete lattice under preferences of all P-agents. In the marriage model the condition
is that preferences be strict. In the assignment game the condition is that only one
assignment is optimal; otherwise, we have the lattice property for the payos only,
not for the underlying assignments. A consequence of the complete lattice property is
that there exists a unique P-optimal outcome, and this is the solution found by both
algorithms mentioned.
In the present paper, we address a challenge raised by Roth and Sotomayor [7] as
well as by others: to explain the similarities in behavior between the two models. In a
recent article, Roth and Sotomayor [8] themselves elaborate on the background of the
question and gives a kind of solution. They present a generalized assignment game that
contains both the old models as special cases, and they show that it too has the lattice
property for payos under the condition that the core equals the ‘core under weak
domination’ (or equivalently, that the set of stable payos equals the set of ‘strongly
stable payos’), but they cannot guarantee that the set of solutions to their game is
nonempty.
Our approach has both similarities and dierences to the approach of Roth and
Sotomayor. We introduce another common generalization of the two old models, in
which we allow for some agents to behave in a way that we call ‘rigid’. It means
that they accept only one particular payo in a given assignment. One may think
of it as there being a rule for payos recommended by for example a labor union,
which some agents feel obliged to follow while others feel no such obligation. This
game is not a special case of Roth{Sotomayor’s, nor does it include their game. It is
possible to extend their theory to conclude that the set of strongly stable payos is
a lattice in our game, but in general the set of stable payos will be larger. Kaneko
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[5] presented another common generalization of the two kinds of markets. Kaneko’s
model is more complicated and, as far as we can see, not closely related to ours. He
proves nonemptiness of the core but does not consider lattice properties or P-optimal
outcomes.
By presenting an algorithm that produces a stable outcome, we prove that the set
of stable outcomes is nonempty for our generalized assignment game. The algorithm
combines ideas from the algorithms for the two previous models together with a vari-
ation of the technique with augmenting paths, well known in matching theory. The
algorithm will work for any integral productivity matrix; we then use non-standard
analysis to derive the existence of a stable outcome for any real-valued productivity
matrix by approximating with non-standard rational numbers.
Furthermore, we introduce a certain non-degeneracy condition that specializes to
strict preferences in the marriage model and to uniqueness of the optimal assignment
in the assignment game. Under this condition we can prove that set of stable outcomes
(i.e. payo combined with assignment) is a complete lattice, and also that the algorithm
produces the P-optimal outcome.
We are grateful to a referee of an earlier version of this paper for pointing us to the
recent article of Roth and Sotomayor, and to another referee for giving the reference
to Kaneko.
2. The old models and the new generalized model
In order to set the context, we present in turn the marriage model, the assignment
game and our new generalized game: the RiFle game.
2.1. The marriage model
In the marriage model, let P be a set of men and Q be a set of women. Every man
has preferences on the women, and every woman has preferences on the men. The
preferences can be represented by a list of names in order of preference, where a lists
only the potential partners he or she would prefer being matched with to being single.
Let  be an assignment of men to women. If  has two matched pairs p1
$ q1 and
p2
$ q2 where p1 prefers q2 to q1 and q2 prefers p1 to p2 then the pair p1; q2 is a
blocking pair. A stable assignment is an assignment without blocking pairs.
Gale and Shapley [3] presented a nice algorithm for nding a stable assignment in
this model. Briey, the algorithm runs over a nite number of time steps; in each step
every man proposes to the woman who is most preferred on his list of preferences.
Each woman tentatively engages the most prefererred of her proposers and reject the
rest of them. The rejected men remove the rejecting woman from the top of their list,
and in the next time step they proceed to the next one. The engaged man stays, and
proposes to the same woman at the next time step too. When every woman has at
most one proposer, the stable assignment has been obtained.
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2.2. The assignment game
In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [9], as described in Roth and So-
tomayor [7], let P = fp1; : : : ; png be a set of employers and Q = fq1; : : : ; qng a set of
workers. Every pair (pi; qj) has a potential productivity ij>0. If  is an assignment
(i.e. a matching of P-agents to Q-agents), then its total productivity is
T =
X
pi
$ qj
ij:
The total productivity is distributed as payos: every employer pi gets payo ui>0
and every worker qj gets payo vj>0, such that the sum of the payos is T. An
outcome in the assignment game is an assignment  together with compatible payo
vectors u and C.
An outcome is stable if there are no blocking pairs. This is equivalent to the condition
ui + vj>ij for all i; j, since ui + vj <ij would mean that the pair (pi; qj) could be
better o by leaving their current matches and join forces to obtain the productivity
ij. Shapley and Shubik proved that the underlying assignment of a stable outcome is
always optimal, i.e. it yields maximal total productivity.
The existence of a stable outcome in the assignment game was nonconstructively
proved by Shapley and Shubik [9]. Demange et al. [2] gave an algorithm that constructs
an outcome. The algorithm is a sort of auction procedure, where the employers raise
their bids on the workers until only one bidder is left. We will use ideas also from
this algorithm when devising the procedure for a more general model.
It is a natural idea to include reservation prices in the model. This means that an
agent pi or qj can choose to stay unmatched, in which case he receives his reservation
price, denoted by uri>0 and v
r
j>0, respectively.
2.3. New model: the RiFle assignment game
Let us now dene our new model, the RiFle assignment game (RI for rigid and
FLE for exible) and see how it includes both the previous ones. Let P=fp1; : : : ; png
and Q = fq1; : : : ; qng be two equally large sets of agents. (By introduction of dummy
agents, this condition can always be met.) To each pair (pi; qj) is assigned a pair of
nonnegative real numbers (ij; ij).
The interpretation of these numbers is that for each possible partnership (pi; qj), the
potential productivity is ij = ij + ij, and it is somehow prescribed that this produc-
tivity should be distributed so that pi gets the payo ij and qj gets the payo ij. An
agent who will always demand that this distribution rule be followed strictly (that is,
who will accept the prescribed payo only; no more, no less) is called rigid. An agent
who is willing to negotiate and use side payments is called exible. In our model,
every agent is either rigid or exible.
In this model it is easy to represent reservation prices uri and v
r
j : for every agent
we insert a rigid dummy agent whose value to him is the reservation price, but whose
value to anyone else is zero.
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Let R be the set of all rigid pairs: pairs (pi; qj) such that at least one of the agents
pi and qj is rigid. Let F be the set of all exible pairs: pairs (pi; qj) such that both
agents are exible. Hence, R [F= P  Q.
2.4. A rst example
Consider the following productivity matrix where the entries are (ij; ij):
q1 q2(r)
p1 (3; 3) (3; 6)
p2(r) (2; 5) (10; 5)
Here p2 and q2 are rigid agents, while p1 and q1 are exible. The only exible pair is
then (p1; q1). What is a reasonable payo in this game? Under the matching p1
$ q1;
p2
$ q2, the rigid pair will receive u2 = 10 and 5 while the exible pair will split the
productivity 3 + 3 = 6, for example as u1 = 2 and v1 = 4. However, such an outcome
of the game will not be stable: the unmatched pair (p1; q2) is then a blocking pair
since by cooperating they would improve their payos from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6,
respectively.
2.5. Stability in the RiFle game
We shall now formalize the notion of stable outcomes discussed in the previous
example.
Denition 2.1. An outcome of the RiFle assignment game is a matching  of P-agents
to Q-agents, together with a payo, i.e. a pair of vectors (u; C) 2 RnRn. An outcome
is denoted by (u; C; ). The outcome is feasible if it satises:
1. Individual rationality. All payos must be nonnegative, i.e. ui>0; vj>0 for all
pi; qj.
2. Rigidity. A rigid agent, say pi, who is matched, say to qj, must get payo ui=ij.
If the match qj is a exible agent, then his payo must be vj>ij.
3. Non-wastefulness. The sum of all payos equals the total productivity, that is,X
pi2P
ui +
X
qj2Q
vj =
X
pi
$ qj
ij:
A stable outcome is a feasible outcome satisfying the stability condition of absence
of blocking pairs. This can be expressed as
ui + vj>ij for (pi; qj) 2F;
ui>ij or vj>ij for (pi; qj) 2 R:
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A payo (u; C) is feasible (resp. stable) if (u; C; ) is a feasible (resp. stable) outcome
for some matching . Such a matching  is said to be compatible with the payo (u; C).
2.5.1. Justication for the RiFle assignment game
There are both mathematical and empirical reasons for introducing this new model.
To start with the latter, it is a fact that most markets are not entirely free but are
regulated in various ways, for example by salary policies, and that certain people are
more prone to ignore regulations than other people. The RiFle assignment game is a
crude attempt to take this into account in the model.
Now for the mathematical justication. If all agents are exible, then we are back in
the assignment game. On the other hand, if all agents are rigid, then the xed payos
are directly translateable to preferences and we are back in the marriage model. It is
therefore justied to say that the RiFle assignment game is a common generalization
of these models. We will now proceed with showing that the fact that the two old
models have certain important properties in common can be explained by showing that
these properties are owned also by the RiFle assignment game.
3. Summary: results for the RiFle assignment game
It is time to give a brief description of the results we will prove for the RiFle
assignment game. Concepts such as core and strong stability that are mentioned below
will be dened in Section 4 as we go along.
1. There are no side payments in stable outcomes.
2. The set of stable outcomes equals the core of the game.
3. The set of strongly stable payos is a lattice (in general not complete) under
P-preferences.
4. The set of stable outcomes is nonempty, and we present an algorithm that nds
a stable outcome for integral matrices.
The algorithm is a heavy piece of work and we treat it, and how to go in the limit
to prove the existence of stable outcomes also for real-valued matrices, separately in
Section 5. This is as far as we can get without putting some additional restrictions
on the model. In Section 6 we will then introduce a non-degeneracy condition on
the game, specializing to strict preferences in the marriage model and to uniqueness of
the optimal assignment in the assignment game. Given non-degeneracy, we can add the
following results to our list.
5. Among stable outcomes, the underlying matching is uniquely determined by the
payo.
6. The set of stable outcomes is a lattice
7. The lattice is complete and hence it has unique P- and Q-optimal elements.
8. The algorithm produces the P-optimal outcome (for integral productivity
matrices.)
K. Eriksson, J. Karlander /Discrete Mathematics 217 (2000) 135{156 141
3.1. A comparison with Roth and Sotomayor’s approach
Actually, the generalized assignment game of Roth and Sotomayor (henceforth
referred to as the R{S game) works with utility functions in the vein of Demange
and Gale [1]. For simplicity though, we will assume that utility is linearly and uni-
formly correlated to money, so that we can describe their approach in terms of plain
money only. We also change their notations somewhat to facilitate comparison to the
RiFle game.
In this version of the R{S game, we have a matrix of pairs of numbers (ij; ij) and
reservation prices uri ; v
r
j . Payments are allowed within matched pairs only, so a feasible
outcome (u; C; ) must to begin with satisfy ui + vj = ij + ij if pi
$ qj (as well as
individual rationality, of course). Given such an outcome, we can dene the monetary
transfer to pi from his match qj by si=ui−ij. In the R{S game it is prescribed that the
monetary transfers must belong to some set S. If S=f0g, then the R{S game specializes
to the totally rigid RiFle game, i.e. the marriage model. If S=R then it specializes to the
totally exible RiFle game, i.e. the assignment game. (As we will see below, there will
be no side payments in the RiFle game either, although they are not a priori ruled out).
Roth and Sotomayor assume that all monetary transfers belong to the same set S, as
opposed to the situation in the RiFle game where the monetary transfer in rigid pairs
must be zero, while in exible pairs it can be any real number. However, we have
found that the R{S game can be generalized in the same direction, with a separate
set Sij of possible monetary transfers for every possible pair in a matching, without
aecting the proofs of Roth and Sotomayor!
The main results proved for the R{S game is that the set S of stable payos is a
compact lattice under the following three assumptions:
1. S is non-empty,
2. S is closed, and
3. S coincides with Ss, the set of strongly stable payos.
As we will discuss more in detail later, an outcome is strongly stable if it has no weak
blocking pair, i.e. a pair such that one agent prefers it to his current match while the
other agent is indierent.
Assumption 3 is the crucial one, and it does not usually hold for the RiFle game.
However, what Roth and Sotomayor really prove, although they never explicity state
it, is that the set Ss of strongly stable payos in the R{S game is always a lattice
(possibly empty or not closed). Hence, this is true for the RiFle game too, as we
discuss in Section 4.3.
4. Results without non-degeneracy conditions
We will present our results in the order of the list in the summary, starting with the
two easy observations.
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4.1. Side payments
Though exible agents are not a priori unwilling to engage in the practice of side
payments, there will be no such thing in a stable outcome.
Proposition 4.1. If pi is matched to qj in a stable outcome; then their joint payo
equals their joint productivity; i.e. ui + vj = ij.
Proof. If pi is matched to qj then necessarily ui+vj>ij, thanks to the rigidity condi-
tion for rigid pairs and the stability condition for exible pairs. Then non-wastefulness
forces all these inequalities to be equalities.
Remark. If the rigidity condition were relaxed so that a exible agent in a rigid pair
could accept also a payment less than his prescribed share, side payments could occur
in a stable outcome. For example, consider the following market:
q1(r) q2(r)
p1 (3; 3) (4; 6)
p2 (1; 1) (10; 5)
Here q1 and q2 are rigid agents, while p1 and p2 are exible. If the rigidity condition
is relaxed for exible agents, then
p1
$ q1; p2 $ q2; u1 = 5; u2 = 8; v1 = 3; v2 = 5
is a stable outcome where p2 has paid p1 two units to make him match with q1 so
that p2 can match with the for him much more protable agent q2.
The rigidity condition we have chosen does not take into account such long-term
planning by agents, but rather assumes that the agent p2 in the above example would
prefer getting his rigid share of ten units than his present lot of eight, although this
solution would be unstable and in fact he would end up with just one single unit.
Though the lattice analysis depends on our choice of rigidity, the algorithm we will
present below is insensitive to this choice; regardless of this denition it will nd a
stable outcome without side payments!
4.2. The core of the RiFle assignment game
An outcome y is dominated by another outcome x if there exists a coalition A of
agents such that every member of A prefers x to y and the rules of the game allow
them to enforce x over y. The core of a game is dened as the set of undominated
outcomes.
Proposition 4.2. The core of the RiFle assignment game equals the set of stable
outcomes.
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Proof. It is trivial that outcomes in the core must be individually rational and satisfy
rigidity, non-wastefulness and stability. Hence the core is a subset of the stable out-
comes. For the other direction, we must show that an outcome outside the core cannot
be stable. But a coalition C cannot enforce obtaining more money than their total pro-
ductivity under cooperation in pairs within C, so at least some pair must get at most as
much money from the coalition as if they were to split their joint productivity. Since
both prefer the coalition, they also prefer the pair. Hence they are a blocking pair.
4.3. Strong stability
Let us now dig out as much as we can get from the work of Roth and Sotomayor,
cf. Section 3.1. First, we give a formal denition of strong stability. Recall that a weak
blocking pair is a pair such that one agent prefers it to his current match while the
other agent is indierent. A exible pair can never be weakly blocking; if one agent is
indierent and the other agent makes a prot, then the latter one can share his prot
to make both agents prefer the match. Consequently, it is sucient to consider rigid
pairs.
Denition 4.3. An outcome is strongly stable if it is stable and contains no weak
blocking pair, i.e.
ui = ij ) vj>ij and vj = ij ) ui>ij for (pi; qj) 2 R:
Similarly we dene a strongly stable payo.
Roth and Sotomayor like to assume that the set of strongly stable payos coincides
with the set of stable payos, as they do in the assignment game, as well as in the
marriage model when preferences are strict. However, there seems to be no reasonable
condition to guarantee the validity of such an assumption when there are both rigid
and exible agents simultaneously. For example, consider the following market, where
we give just ij for exible pairs but (ij; ij) for rigid pairs:
q1 q2(r)
p1 18 (10; 7)
p2 21 (14; 5)
Here the agent q2 is rigid while all the others are exible. This game is non-degenerate
in the sense that we will dene in Section 6, but nonetheless it has a stable solution
that is not strongly stable:
p1
$ q1; p2 $ q2; u1 = 10; u2 = 14; v1 = 8; v2 = 5
is stable but it is not strongly stable since it has a weak blocking pair, (p1; q2), where
the exible agent p1 is indierent while the rigid agent q2 would strictly prefer match-
ing with p1 to his current match with p2.
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We dene the partial order of P-preferences by >P0 if u>u0 and C6C0 (com-
ponentwise comparisons). Generalizing the R{S game to accept dierent sets Sij of
monetary transfers for dierent pairs, the analysis of Roth and Sotomayor implies:
Proposition 4.4. The set of strongly stable payos in the RiFle assignment game is
a lattice under >P .
However, this lattice needs not be compact so we cannot say that it will have a
P-optimal member (in fact, it usually will not).
5. There exists a stable outcome of the RiFle assignment game
Our rst main result is that the RiFle assignment game always has a stable outcome.
Theorem 5.1. The set of stable outcomes in the RiFle assignment game is non-empty.
We will prove the theorem by rst using non-standard analysis to verify that it is
enough to show existence for stable outcomes for integral matrices, and then giving an
algorithm that nds a stable outcome for such matrices. In Section 6 we will discuss
an additional nice property of the algorithm: if a certain non-degeneracy condition is
satised, then the outcome found by the algorithm is optimal among stable outcomes
for all P-agents.
5.1. Discretization
Our algorithm assumes a discrete version, where all ij, ij, ui and vi are integers.
Hence it works also when all numbers are multiples of 1=N for some N > 0. To
prove the theorem for reals, one can approximate the numbers by multiples of 1=N
and let N tend to innity. The payo vectors will then converge to some limit vectors
that will satisfy the compatibility and stability conditions. To prove this last part has
been considered dicult for such algorithms; cf. the book of Hall [4] for one proof
for an algorithm solving the assignment problem. However, using the techniques from
non-standard analysis (that really deserves to be better known) we shall easily prove
our case. Any non-standard proof like this one can be transformed to a standard proof,
but then it will not look as pretty.
5.1.1. Basic non-standard analysis
For the logical underpinnings of non-standard analysis, we refer to the book by
Robinson [6]. In non-standard analysis, we work in a higher-order non-standard model
of analysis, denoted by R. This is an enlargement of the system R of real numbers. In
R we have access to a larger set of numbers than just the reals: we have also innite
numbers and innitesimal numbers. Innite numbers behave as one would expect; in
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particular, the sum of two positive innite numbers is a new positive innite number.
The innitesimals are innitely small, i.e. smaller than all positive reals. In this en-
larged universe of non-standard numbers, every number a has a standard part, denoted
by st(a), which is the unique standard number that diers from a only by an innites-
imal. We write a b if the dierence between two non-standard numbers a and b is
innitesimal. If a and b are nite, then a b implies st(a)= st(b). The standardization
operator preserves equalities as well as non-strict (but not strict) inequalities, i.e.
a= b) st(a) = st(b); a>b) st(a)>st(b):
A main principle of non-standard analysis is that mathematical statements that can be
expressed in standard formalism have the same truth value in both the standard model
and the enlarged non-standard model. For our particular case, we will consider the
statement that for any matrix (ij; ij)ij of natural numbers there is a stable outcome
(u; C; ). In the non-standard model, this is a statement for non-standard natural numbers
(which may be innite) and the numbers in the outcome may also be non-standard. We
shall prove that this implies the same statement for real-valued matrices by transforming
them to matrices of non-standard natural numbers and then show that the standard part
of the outcome is also a stable outcome. We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. Fix an innite non-standard natural number N . Then for any real num-
ber a there exists a non-standard integer a^ such that a  a^=N .
Proof. In the standard model we have the following statement: Given a natural number
N and a real number a, there exists an integer a^ such that ja − a=N j< 1=N . This
statement then must hold in the non-standard model too. In particular, if N is an
innite natural number then 1=N is innitesimal and hence a  a^=N .
Lemma 5.3. If the RiFle game has a stable outcome for any productivity matrix of
natural numbers; then it does for any productivity matrix of non-negative reals.
Proof. Let (ij; ij)ij be a productivity matrix of non-negative reals. Fix an innite
non-standard natural number N and choose non-standard natural numbers (^ij ; ^ij)ij ac-
cording to the above lemma. By the hypothesis, there is then a non-standard stable outcome
(u^; C^; ) for the RiFle game dened by (^ij ; ^ij)ij. Hence, we have non-wastefulness,X
pi2P
u^ i +
X
qj2Q
v^j =
X
pi
$ qj
^ij + ^ij ; (1)
as well as the equalities that dene rigidity and the non-strict inequalities that de-
ne individual rationality and stability. Divide both sides of all these equalities and
inequalities by the innite non-standard natural number N . Eq. (1) becomesX
pi2P
u^ i=N +
X
qj2Q
v^j=N =
X
pi
$ qj
^ij=N + ^ij=N 
X
pi
$ qj
ij + ij
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and since the expression to the right is nite, all numbers in the expression to the left
must be nite too. Hence, their standard parts exist so we can dene ui = st(u^ i=N )
and vi = st(v^i=N ). By denition, we have ij = st(^ij=N ) and ij = st(^ij=N ). Since the
standardization operator preserves equalities and non-strict inequalities, we have proved
that the outcome (u; C; ) is a stable outcome of the real-valued RiFle game.
5.2. Overview of the algorithm
Given an integral productivity matrix, we will describe an algorithm that nds a
stable outcome via a kind of auction mechanism. We begin with the price vector
C = [0; : : : ; 0]. In the course of the algorithm, the prices on the Q-agents will only
increase, never decrease. The algorithm will in each step modify the price vector C as
well as a map  : P ! Q, until  is injective, that is, a matching. If, at a given point
in the course of the algorithm, we have (pi) = qj, we say that pi proposes to qj at
this point. If pi proposes to qj and at least one of the agents pi and qj are rigid, we
say that this is a rigid proposal.
First, we dene a function fij(x) that tells us the value of qj to pi if the price on
qj is x, that is, if qj is to get the payo vj = x. The value will tacitly depend also on
the current map :
fij(x) =
8>>>><
>>>>:
ij + ij − x if (pi; qj) 2F;
ij if (pi; qj) 2 R and either x<ij or x = ij
and (pi) = qj;
0 if (pi; qj) 2 R and either x>ij or x = ij
and (pi) 6= qj:
The dependence on the map  will assure that in a rigid pair, when the price on
a Q-agent qj is as high as rigidity allows for a P-agent pi, and pi is not currently
mapped to qj, then he will never be so in the future either, because the value is set
to zero. In this way, we bar rejected rigid proposals from ever being renewed.
For each pi, let Di be the set of potential partners of maximal value to pi, that is,
Di:=

qk :fik(vk) = max
j
fij(vj)

:
The goal of the algorithm is to produce an assignment  and payo vectors u and C
satisfying the following conditions:
1. qi 2 Di for all i.
2. ui>0; vj>0 for all i; j.
3. If (pi) = qj, then ui + vj = ij + ij. If in addition (pi; qj) 2 R, then ui = ij and
vi = ij.
The second and third conditions say that the payos are compatible with the assignment.
The rst condition implies stability; there can be no blocking pair if every pi has his
best possible partner.
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The algorithm will in each step modify the price vector nchb and the map  so that
it always satises (pi) 2 Di. (Note that the set Di is not xed but depends on the
current price vector C.) As soon as the map  is injective, the algorithm halts.
As in many matching algorithms, we will use a notion of ‘augmenting paths’. Let
us dene the relation qj  qk if there exists a pi such that (pi) = qj and qk 2 Di,
that is, if qj has a proposer that equally well could have proposed to qk . Further, let
us extend this relation by transitivity, so we say that qk1 is connected to qkm if there
exists a ‘path’ qk1  qk2      qkm .
The algorithm is structured into subprocesses. Subprocess A is basically the Gale{
Shapley algorithm for nding stable matchings in the marriage model. After subprocess
A is completed, every Q-agent will be subject to at most one rigid proposal. This will
be used in subprocess B, which nds augmenting paths from Q-agents that are already
in the image of  to Q-agents that have either no proposals or a rigid proposal. After
subprocess B is completed, there are no such augmenting paths, so if  is still not
injective, then there must be some Q-agent that has several proposers but which is not
part of an augmenting path. In subprocess C, prices are increased on all such Q-agents
and all Q-agents connected to them, and everything is repeated anew.
The algorithm has two important properties: rst, the prices C never decrease; and
second, if at some point some qj gets a proposer, then qj will never again be without
proposers during the algorithm. The algorithm will halt when every qj has a proposer.
5.3. The algorithm
We are given the sets P and Q of agents, and the pairs of non-negative integers
(ij; ij) for every pair (pi; qj) of PQ. We will also have a price vector C and a map
 : P ! Q that will both be modied during the algorithm. In the rst step we set
C:=[0; : : : ; 0] and choose  such that (pi) 2 Di for every pi. This is possible, since
it is obvious from the denition that every Di is always nonempty.
5.3.1. Subprocess A
Find all qj that have a rigid proposal. For every such qj, nd a proposer pi such
that ij is maximal, that is,
ij =maxfkj: (pk) = qj and (pk; qj) 2 Rg:
Set vj:=ij. We keep the proposer pi, and bar from ever proposing to qk again any
other pk that at this point proposes rigidly to qk .
Subsequently, for every P-agent pi, we recompute their sets Di after the modication
of the price vector C. A new map  is chosen such that (pi) 2 Di for every pi. Repeat
the process, increasing C in each run, until nothing changes anymore.
When subprocess A halts, every Q-agent will be subject to a rigid proposal from at
most one P-agent. However, a exible Q-agent may still have several exible proposers.
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5.3.2. Subprocess B
Recall that qj  qk means that qj has a proposer that could have proposed equally
well to qk , and that qk1 is connected to qkm if there exists a path qk1  qk2      qkm .
Abusing notation, let pkl denote a proposer that could have proposed equally well to
qkl+1 instead of to qkl . In subprocess B we do the following:
1. Suppose we nd a path qk1  qk2      qkm such that qk1 has at least one
extra proposer pi except for pk1 , while qkm has no proposer at all. Then we modify 
by setting (pk1 ) := qk2 ; : : : ; (pkm−1 ):=qkm . For all other P-agents,  maps as before.
This augments the image of  by one agent, qkm . Now subprocess A is run again.
2. Suppose we nd a path qk1  qk2      qkm such that qk1 has at least one extra
proposer pi except for pk1 , while qkm is subject to a rigid proposal. (We may here have
m=1.) As in the previous case, we modify  by setting (pk1 ):=qk2 ; : : : ; (pkm−1 ):=qkm .
Let ps be the rigid proposer of qkm . Set (ps) to be undened for the moment, and
bar ps from ever proposing to qkm again. For all other P-agents,  maps as before.
This does not change the image of , but the set of barred rigid proposals has been
augmented. Now subprocess A is run again.
As long as any of these alternatives is possible, the process is repeated. (If several
possibilities are open, choose one.)
5.3.3. Subprocess C
Let M be the set of all Q-agents that are (i) connected to some Q-agent who has
more than one proposer, and (ii) not connected to any Q-agents that have either no
proposal or a rigid proposal. Modify the price vector C by increasing vj by one for
all qj 2M . Now subprocess B is run again. The whole process is repeated until  has
become injective.
5.4. Correctness of the algorithm
We will now show that subprocess C, and hence the algorithm, will eventually halt.
In each step (pi) 2 Di holds. Every qj that has ever had a proposer will always have
some proposer. The price vector C sometimes increases, but never decreases. In the
rst step, C= [0; : : : ; 0]. This means that if some qk does not have a proposer at some
point, then vk is still zero, in which case the value fik(vk) of qk for pi is greater than
zero. When qj is a Q-agent who does have a proposer pi, and the price is allowed
to increase suciently, we will arrive at a non-positive value of qj for pi, fij(vj)60.
Then qj 62 Di, so eventually we must have qk 2 Di for some pi. When subprocess
C is used, there must eventually exist a path from some qj with several proposers to
qk . When subprocess B is used, qk gets a proposer. In this way all Q-agents must
eventually get proposers, so  is a matching.
The price vector v is determined by the algorithm, and will be non-negative. Suppose
that (pi) = qj. Then if (pi; qj) 2F, we set ui:=ij + ij − vj. On the other hand, if
(pi; qj) 2 R, we set ui:=ij. The only thing that remains to be checked is that all ui
are non-negative. But since Q-agents with no proposers always have had zero price,
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they have always been of positive value to all P-agents, and the same thing must of
course hold for the matched pairs.
5.5. An example of running the algorithm
Finally, let us illustrate the algorithm with an example. Let P = fp1; p2; p3; p4; p5g
and Q=fq1; q2; q3; q4; q5g, with three rigid agents: p1, p2 and q1. The following matrix
of recommended productivity distributions is given.
q1(r) q2 q3 q4 q5
p1(r) (7; 6) (9; 9) (4; 9) (6; 5) (6; 4)
p2(r) (8; 5) (9; 9) (3; 5) (7; 7) (2; 5)
p3 (5; 8) 17 13 13 8
p4 (1; 5) 8 10 9 6
p5 (1; 6) 12 8 9 7
From the beginning we have the price vector v=[0; 0; 0; 0; 0]. Then the value matrix
(fij(vj)) at this point is
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
p1 7 9 4 6 6
p2 8 9 3 7 2
p3 5 17 13 13 8
p4 1 8 10 9 6
p5 1 12 8 9 7
; (P) = [q2; q2; q2; q3; q2]:
Here for each row the maximum values are boxed. Since in this case the maximum
value was unique in each row, there is no freedom of choice for the map . Now
run subprocess A. Only q2 has rigid proposals; both of the same payo, 12 = 22 = 9.
Pick one of these proposers, say p1, and bar p2. Raise the price on q2 to 9, so now
v= [0; 9; 0; 0; 0]. Recompute the values and the map:
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
p1 7 9 4 6 6
p2 8 0 3 7 2
p3 5 8 13 13 8
p4 1 −1 10 9 6
p5 1 3 8 9 7
; (P) = [q2; q1; q3; q3; q4]:
For (p3) we had a choice between q3 and q4. Now run subprocess A. Only q1
has a new rigid proposal, raising the price on q1 to 5, giving v = [5; 9; 0; 0; 0]. The
values and the map do not change, so we can proceed to subprocess B. None of the
conditions in subprocess B are satised, so we proceed to subprocess C.
In subprocess C we identify the set M=fq3; q4g as being of the desired kind: q3 has
two proposers, it is connected to q4, and q4 has a proposer. They are not connected
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to anyone else. Raise the price by one on both q3 and q4, to obtain v = [5; 9; 1; 1; 0].
Subprocess B still does not kick into action, so we return to subprocess C where the
price on q3 and q4 is raised another unit, yielding v= [5; 9; 2; 2; 0].
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
p1 7 9 4 6 6
p2 8 0 3 7 2
p3 5 8 11 11 8
p4 1 −1 8 7 6
p5 1 3 6 7 7
; (P) = [q2; q1; q3; q3; q4]:
Now, we see that the prices on q3 and q4 have been raised enough for p5 to nd
it worth considering proposing to q5 instead. In this situation subprocess B identies
the path q3  q4  q5, where q3 has two proposers while q5 has none. This is an
augmenting path, so we change the map accordingly to (P) = [q2; q1; q4; q3; q5]. Now
the map is injective, so the algorithm halts. From the price vector we get payos
C = [5; 9; 2; 2; 0] and u = [9; 8; 11; 8; 7]. The reader is encouraged to check that this is
indeed a stable outcome, since no unmatched pair can do better by cooperating.
6. Introducing a non-degeneracy condition
Neither in the marriage model nor in the assignment game is the set of stable
outcomes always a lattice (although in the assignment game the set of stable payos
is always a lattice). In degenerate cases there may be, for example, two dierent best
possible outcomes. To guarantee the lattice property some non-degeneracy conditions
are needed. For the marriage model a sucient condition is strictness of preferences,
which in the RiFle model with all agents rigid translates to
ij = ij0 ) j = j0; ij = i0j ) i = i0:
For the assignment game, the stable outcomes form a lattice if and only if there
is a unique optimal assignment, that is if there is a unique matching  such that the
total productivity T is optimal. A sucient condition for uniqueness of the optimal
assignment is that for any two matchings  and 0, and a minimal coalition C of agents
such that all C-agents are matched to each other in both  and 0, we have that  and
0 must either coincide on C or yield dierent total productivities on C, i.e.X
pi;qj2C
pi
$ qj
ij =
X
pi;qj2C
pi
0$ qj
ij )  = 0 on C:
The non-degeneracy condition that we have found sucient for the lattice property
in the RiFle game contains the conditions above as obvious special cases.
Denition 6.1. Given a coalition C of agents and an assignment  (i.e. no payos),
we say that the total payo to C under  is forced if all matched pairs of one agent in
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C and one agent outside C are rigid, because due to rigidity and the absence of side
payments the payo to C must then beX
pi2C
pi
$ qj
ij +
X
qj2C
pi
$ qj
ij:
(Recall that an unmatched agent who gets his reservation price is represented as being
matched to a rigid dummy agent.)
We say that the RiFle assignment game is non-degenerate if the following holds for
any two matchings  and 0: if C is a minimal coalition such that the payo is forced
under both  and 0, and the forced payos are equal, then  and 0 coincide on C.
In the special case when all agents are exible, this condition is obviously identical
to the earlier one. In the special case when all agents are rigid, the minimal coalitions
consist of one agent and the condition says that his payo is never indierent over
choice of match, i.e. his preferences are strict.
Remark. Is the non-degeneracy condition computable? Yes, but in exponential time.
The condition translates to the following inequalities, which must hold for any k > 0
and any renumbering of the agents:
1. 11 +   + kk 6= 21 +   + k; k−1 + 1k :
2. 11 +   + kk + 00 6= 10 +   + k; k−1 + k+1; k :
3. 11 +   + kk + 00 6= 01 +   + k−1; k + k; k+1:
4. 11 +   + kk 6= 12 +   + k−1; k + 01 + k; k+1:
In these expressions, the agents p0 and q0 are allowed to be identical to pk+1 and
qk+1 respectively.
6.1. Determination of matching from payo
Given a stable outcome in a non-degenerate RiFle game, it is possible to determine
the underlying matching from the payo.
Proposition 6.2. In a non-degenerate game; only one matching is compatible with a
stable payo.
Proof. To begin with, we can directly determine the match of every rigid agent, say
pi with payo ui, since by rigidity ui=ij for some qj, and by non-degeneracy all ij
for varying j are dierent.
Remaining agents are exible and matched to each other. By non-degeneracy there
is a unique matching of the remaining agents that has the remaining payo as total
productivity.
Combining this observation with the result that the set of strongly stable payos is
a lattice (Proposition 4.4), we have that the set of all strongly stable outcomes is a
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lattice in the non-degenerate case. But we want to say something even stronger: that
the set of all stable outcomes is a lattice. One possible way of completing the result
would be to show that every outcome that is stable but not strongly stable can be
approximated arbitrarily close by a strongly stable outcome. However, this turns out
to be as complicated as showing the theorem from rst principles without refering to
the work of Roth and Sotomayor, so we prefer to do it that way instead.
6.2. Lattice property of stable outcomes
We are going to prove the lattice property. By abusing notation, let  and 0 denote
the outcomes with underlying matchings  and 0 and payos (u; C) and (u0; C0) re-
spectively. We dene the partial order of P-preferences by >P0 if u>u0 and C6C0
(componentwise comparisons).
Theorem 6.3. For a non-degenerate RiFle game; the set of all stable outcomes is a
lattice under the partial order >P of P-preferences.
Proving the lattice theorem will take some work. We must nd a join  _ 0 and a
meet  ^ 0 under >P . It is obvious what we would like  =  _ 0 to be: it should
have payos u i=max(ui; u0i) and vi=min(vi; v
0
i) and a compatible matching. But there
is not necessarily a compatible matching!
6.2.1. Why non-degeneracy is needed
Consider the following productivity matrix:
q1 q2(r)
p1(r) (4; 5) (2; 3)
p2 11 (6; 7)
There are two stable outcomes: on one hand, p1
$ q1 and p2 $ q2 with payo u1 =4,
u2 =6, v1 =5, v2 =7 is a stable outcome; on the other hand p1
0$ q2 and p2 
0
$ q1 with
payo u01 = 2, u
0
2 = 6, v
0
1 = 5, v
0
2 = 3 is a stable outcome too. But the payo given by
u i =max(ui; u0i) and vi =min(vi; v
0
i) is not compatible with any matching.
We shall show that under the non-degeneracy conditions, a compatible matching 
can be found.
6.2.2. Finding a compatible matching
Fix two stable outcomes  and 0. We represent any unmatched agent in  or 0
as being matched to a rigid dummy agent, such that the real agent’s payo is his
reservation price, should they cooperate. The dummy agent prefers being matched to
being unmatched. If an agent was unmatched in both  and 0, he is now matched to
the same dummy agent in both cases.
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We start by dening the digraph G(; 0) on the vertex set P [ Q as the union of
the matchings  and 0, i.e. with the following edges:
f(pi; qj): pi $ qj or pi 
0
$ qjg;
labeled by the corresponding payos, (ui; vj) or (u0i ; v
0
j). Since  and 
0 are matchings,
this graph has vertices of degrees zero, one and two only. We now give some edges
directions as follows. Direct an edge (pi; qj) towards qj if pi prefers this edge, i.e. if it
is the only edge incident to pi, or if the payo to pi from this edge is strictly greater
than the payo from the other edge. No edge becomes bidirected, because if the two
agents both prefer being matched according to one outcome they would constitute a
blocking pair in the other outcome, contradicting stability.
Hence, we now have a graph where edges are either undirected or directed. Since
no degrees are greater than two, all connected components are paths or cycles. If a
component is a path, its two endpoints are dummy agents and the last edge at both
ends is directed from the dummy towards the real agent.
Lemma 6.4. In a non-degenerate game; a path in G(; 0) between two rigid agents
cannot consist of indierent agents only (unless it is an undirected two-cycle).
Proof. Let C be the set of agents in-between the two rigid agents. Then it is a minimal
coalition with forced total payment in both  and 0. If all agents in C were indierent,
then the forced total payos would be equal, contradicting non-degeneracy.
Recall that non-degeneracy implies strict preferences of all rigid agents.
Lemma 6.5. In a non-degenerate game; an indierent (and hence exible) agent in
G(; 0) cannot be preferred by a exible agent.
Proof. Without loss of generality, say that pi
$ qj where pi is indierent and preferred
by qj. Indierence of pi means that ui= u0i , while preference of qj means that vj >v
0
j.
Hence u0i+ v
0
j <ui+ vj=ij, so if qj were exible then pi and qj would be a blocking
pair in 0. Thus qj must be rigid.
Lemma 6.6. In a non-degenerate game; all directed edges in a component of G(; 0)
must be directed in the same way along the path or cycle.
Proof. A directed path in a component must end in an indierent agent. Thanks to the
previous lemma, the last edge in a directed path must then be directed from a rigid agent
towards a exible agent. Suppose we have two directed paths with dierent directions
in a component (a path or a cycle). Then we must have a path segment of indierent
agents whose rst and last members are prefered by rigid agents, contradicting the
result of Lemma 6.4.
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This gives us, to begin with, the following result that is well known in the two old
models.
Proposition 6.7. If the non-degeneracy condition holds; then the set of unmatched
agents is the same in all stable outcomes.
Proof. The previous lemma says that all directed edges must have the same direction
along a path in G(; 0), but every path component has dierently directed edges at the
ends. Hence there can be no path components, so there are no agents that are matched
in  but unmatched in 0 or vice versa.
Now we are ready to prove the lattice theorem.
Proof of Theorem 6.3. Since all directed edges in a cycle are directed in the same
way, either  or 0 has all its directed edges from P- to Q-agents, while the other
matching has all its directed edges from Q- to P-agents. Hence, on this component
the rst matching is compatible with the payos u i = max(ui; u0i) and vj = min(vj; v
0
j)
and the other matching is compatible with u^ i = min(ui; u0i) and v^j = max(vj; v
0
j). By
taking the P-optimal matching on each component we obtain . Since all matched
pairs and their payos come from either  or 0 we must have both individual ra-
tionality, rigidity and non-wastefulness in . It remains to prove stability of . But
by a standard argument a blocking pair in  would be a blocking pair also in ei-
ther  or 0 contradicting the assumption of their stability. For ^ the argument is
analogous.
To summarize, we have found a stable matching compatible with the payo ( u; v)
and by Proposition 6.2 there can be only one such matching.
6.3. Completeness of the lattice
Lemma 6.8. The set of stable payos is compact.
Proof. Let  be a matching and let S be the set of stable payos compatible with .
Then S is a compact set, since all the dening relations for feasibility and stability
are equations and non-strict inequalities. Consequently S is closed, since it is a nite
union of compact sets.
From this result and the lattice result in the non-degenerate case, we immediately
have the following.
Theorem 6.9. If the RiFle game is non-degenerate; then the set of stable outcomes
is a compact lattice. In particular; it has unique P- and Q-optimal outcomes.
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6.4. The algorithm revisited
We now know that when the game is non-degenerate, there is a unique P-optimal
outcome. As we mentioned in the introduction, the classic algorithms for nding a
stable outcome in the marriage model and in the integral assignment game do in fact
nd precisely the P-optimal solution, and we claim that this is the case also for our
new algorithm. The proof idea is quite simple, but some details get technical and we
skip a few of them.
Theorem 6.10. If the non-degeneracy condition is satised for an integral RiFle game;
then the outcome found by the algorithm is optimal among stable outcomes for
P-agents.
Proof (sketch).
Let (m1; m2; : : : ; mn) be the outcomes of the Q-agents in the P-optimal matching. We
enumerate the steps in the algorithm as follows: Every turn of proposals in subprocess
A counts as one step. The same goes for every construction of a path in subprocess
B and every application of subprocess C.
Let [v(i)1 ; v
(i)
2 ; : : : ; v
(i)
n ] be the Q-outcomes at step i in the algorithm. We want to show
that v(i)k 6mk for all i; k. We notice that all the v
(i)
k are non-decreasing and can only
increase in subprocess A or subprocess C. We now study these two cases. We assume
that v(i)k 6mk for all i; k and show that v
(i+1)
k 6mk .
Subprocess A. Suppose v(i+1)a >ma. The increase of va comes from qa accepting
a proposer pb at step i + 1. We claim that there is no stabil matching  giving qa
an outcome smaller than v(i+1)a . Indeed, suppose (qa) = pc and (pb) = qd. In this
matching we must have vd>md>v
(i)
d . If vd>v
(i)
d then pb must prefer qa to qd, given
the Q-outcomes in , since qa at least did not prefer qd to qa at step i. But then
(pb; qa) blocks .
The case vd = v
(i)
d is more complicated. It is possible to show, by using the non-
degeneracy conditions, that the only possibility is that pb; qd are exible, qa is rigid
and qd  qa in subprocess B. Then qd must be contained in a set M , such that qa 62 M ,
and such that M is overdemanded (i.e., the set A: pi 2 A ) DiM contains more
elements than M) at step i − 1. We can use the non-degeneracy conditions to show
that the path containing qd and qa is the only augmenting path at step i. This means
that every stable matching with vd = v
(i)
d must match pb to qa. This shows that there
can be no stable matching  such that (pb) = qd.
Subprocess C. At step i+ 1 the outcomes for the Q-agents in an overdemanded set
M are raised one step. Suppose qa 2 M and v(i+1)a >ma. Then there is a set N M
such that qa 2 N and v(i+1)k = mk + 1, i.e., v(i)k = mk for all qk 2 N . (The mk :s must,
of course, all be integers.) The P-optimal matching P has vs>v
(i)
s for all s such
that qs 62 N . It is then possible to show that N must be overdemanded at these
outcomes. Since the stable matching P cannot contain an overdemanded set this is
impossible.
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7. Concluding remarks
We have introduced an analyzed a new game, the RiFle game, that is a common
generalization of the marriage model and the assignment game, in order to explain the
similarities of the results for these two dierent games. Roth and Sotomayor addressed
the same problem recently, and we have compared our results. Our game is not a
special case of theirs, but we have remarked that their analysis can be extended to
our game. However, the assumptions dier. In particular, the key assumption of Roth
and Sotomayor that the set of stable and strongly stable outcomes are equal does not
hold for our game, but nonetheless we can show that the set of stable outcomes of
the RiFle game is a lattice under P-preferences. An additional feature of our game is
the existence of a stable outcome, which we guarantee by presenting an algorithm that
nds one (indeed, the P-optimal one in the non-degenerate case).
On the other hand, Roth and Sotomayor work with utility functions and not just with
plain money. It is not clear how utility functions could be included in our model; both
the algorithm and the non-degeneracy condition seem to depend on linearity between
money and utility.
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